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(II) STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Claimant is a 26-year employee of UPS who suffered a large L4-5 disc herniation on 
his "Employer's premises" on 12.18.09 when he bent over to tie the laces on his work boots as 
required by his Employer's safety policies. Employer did not dispute that the Claimant suffered 
an "accident" and "injury" that occurred "in the course" of his employment. Employer denied 
The Referee who presided over the 9.28.10 151 bifurcated Hearing held that Claimant's 
injury occurred on his Employer's premises, properly applied the "premises presumption" and 
ruled that Claimant's accident and injury "arose out of" his employment "as a matter of law" 
because Employer to premises presumption. Industrial Commission re-
wrote s it legal standard to "premises 
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and concluded without citing any evidence the record that Employer had come forward with 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. 
The Commission then accepted Employer's invitation to use this claim as a test case and 
reviewed 80 + years of "arose out of' employment case law in an effort to convince this Court 
that it should overrule its rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, 137 
Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002). After analyzing all of the "greater risk" cases, the Commission 
correctly ruled that Claimant had met his burden of proving an accident and injury that "arose 
out of' his employment without even applying the premises presumption and awarded the 
Claimant medical benefits and total temporary disability benefits. 
Employer refused to comply with the Commission's decision and refused to pay benefits 
Instead, Employer filed its 1st interlocutory appeal. This Court dismissed Employer's appeal 
based on Jensen v. Pillsbury, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). Employer then asked the 
Commission to stay enforcement of its Order. The Commission denied Employer's request for a 
stay. Employer attempted its 2nd interlocutory appeal. This Court dismissed it. After Employer's 
2nd attempt to take an interlocutory appeal failed, Employer finally paid Claimant some of the 
benefits that he was entitled to receive under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act in this 
compensable claim. 
The Commission held its final bifurcated hearing over extent of Claimant's disability 
on 5 .1 7 .12 and was totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot 
to 100% and 
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disability benefits. Employer filed its 3rd appeal and asked this Court to reverse both decisions 
the Commission. Claimant ISIF cross-appealed. 
Employer's decision to use this claim as a test case to convince this Court that it should 
overrule its rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine in Spivey has unreasonably deprived the 
Claimant and his family of the "sure and certain" relief that they were promised by the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Act and replaced that relief with 4-5 years of vexatious litigation that 
has resulted in 2 bifurcated Hearings before the Industrial Commission and 3 Employer 
sponsored appeals to the Supreme Court. 
(B) THE rouJ~SE O_F Tij:E PROCEEDINGS 
Employer filed its Motion To Bifurcate on 5.12.10 (R., Vol. I, pp. 11-14). Referee 
Michael Powers held the first bifurcated Hearing in this case on 9.28.10 and entered his proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation to the Commission on 4.20.11 (R., 
Vol. I, pp. 20-31). When the Commission re-wrote Referee Powers' proposed decision, the 
Commission found that "the subject accident occurred on Employer's premises" (R., Vol. I, p. 
36, LI. 15-16), but applied the wrong legal standard based on its misreading of Kessler on Beha(f 
of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28 (1997) and I.R.E. 301 and erroneously 
concluded without citation to any evidence in the record that Employer had come forward with 
sufficient evidence to rebut 
declaring 
General 9 
out 
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premises presumption (R., Vol. I, p. . 23-25). 
vUJL<J>.-.:> presumption rule from Foust V. Birds Eye Division of 
616 (1967) "moot", Commission 
case to a I 
7 
Court case. After discussing the 3 categories of risk might be applicable to different 
hypothetical "arise out employment scenarios, the Commission then cited this Court's 
holding in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P. 3d 788 (2002) and ruled m 
Claimant's favor on the "arose out of' employment question: 
In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely not a 
neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the 
work that Claimant was hired to perform .... To the extent that the longstanding 
rule explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, is to the contrary, we perceive 
that rule is overruled by Spivey. Quite apart from the question of whether or not 
Claimant is entitled to a presumption favoring the compensability of this claim, 
the evidence establishes that Claimant has satisfied his burden of proving the 
occurrence of an accident both arising out and in the course of employment" 
(R., Vol. I, p. 49, L. 24-p. 50, L. 7) (emphasis supplied). 
The Commission awarded the Claimant TTD benefits during his period of recovery and 
100% of the invoiced amount of the denied past medical benefit claims that had been adjudicated 
as Claimant's EX. 7 at the 9 .28 .10 Hearing, but denied Claimant's request for attorney's fees in 
this close case because the Commission felt that this Court's holding in Spivey is the subject of 
legitimate debate (R., Vol. I, p. 51, L. 21 - p. 52, L. 5) 1. 
On 5.19.11 the Claimant filed his 2nd Request For Calendaring of the remaining disputed 
issues in this case (R., Vol. I, pp. 54-56). The Commission could not schedule the final hearing 
because Employer filed its Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on 6.20.11 (R., Vol., I, 
pp. 69-71). Claimant filed a Motion Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal and the Supreme 
granted the s Motion To Dismiss Dismissing Employer's 
on 7.27. 1 pp. 74-75). 
1 The Claimant strongly disagrees with the Commission's that remains the of legitimate debate and 
argues that stare decisis requires all and the Commission to apply this Cou1i's holding in Spivey. 
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Employer then filed a Court's 7.27.11 Order Dismissing 
Appeal which this denied on 8.15.11 after directing Employer's attention to Court's 
holding in Jensen v. Pillsbury Co, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P2d 161 (1992) (R., Vol. I, p. 76). 
Employer then filed a Notice of Intent to File a Workers' Compensation Complaint Against The 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund on 8.18.11 (R. Vol. I, pp. 77-79) and a Complaint against the 
ISIF on 10.19.11 (R., Vol. II, pp. 190-191). 
Employer mocked the Industrial Commission's legal authority in its 9 .16.11 
Memorandum Regarding Payment Obligations (R., Vol. I, p. 91-169) by pointing out that the 
Commission had "no statutory authority to enforce its own awards" (R., Vol. I, p. 94, LL 12-
13) (emphasis supplied). The Claimant filed his Response to Defendants' Motion For Stay of 
5.17.11 Order To Pay Compensation Benefits on 9.27.12 and asked the Commission to Order 
Employer to make prompt payment of all benefits due (R., Vol. II, pp. 170-187). 
On 12.8.11, the Industrial Commission entered its Order Denying Stay and ordered 
Employer to promptly pay to the Claimant all medical and TTD benefits previously awarded to 
Claimant in the Commission's 5.17.11 decision plus statutory interest within 14 days from the 
date of the Commission's 12. 8.11 Order (R., Vol. II, pp. 204-214). The Commission reminded 
Employer that "[iJnjured workers not be in position of having to 
issues 
to lS we 
note to authority to 
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of any surety who unnecessarily delays payment of compensation" (R., Vol. 
210, Ll). 
209, 23 - p. 
Finally, the Commission reminded Employer that "[t]he policy of the workers' 
compensation law is to provide injured workers with sure and certain relief. Claimant is 
correct that an important aspect of sure and certain relief is prompt payment of benefits. 
Claimant's compensation payments should not be delayed for months or years because of a 
voluntary request for bifurcation made by Defendants. There is no manifest injustice or due 
process violation in ordering Defendants to pay an award granted by the bifurcated decision that 
they themselves requested" (R., Vol. II, p. 211, LL 4-9). 
Although Employer had mocked the Industrial Commission's authority and refused to 
comply with its 5.17.11 Order, the Commission ruled in its 12.8.11 Order that the Claimant was 
not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for Employer's unreasonable delay in the payment of 
benefits because Employer had filed a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court and had asked the 
Commission to stay enforcement of its 5.17.11 Order (R., Vol. II, p. 212). 
After Employer received the Commission's 12.8.11 Order compelling the prompt 
payment of benefits, Employer again refused to comply with the Commission's Order and filed a 
Motion Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court (R., Vol. pp. 215 -217). The 
Employer's Motion on 12.19.11 (R., Vol. 237-239). However, on 
1.30.12, Court entered its 
remammg case 
Claimant/ Brief IO 
After more than 2 years of unreasonable denials and contentious litigation, Employer 
finally complied with the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order and 12.8.11 and made 
the unconditional payment of the past denied medical benefits that had been adjudicated at the 
9.28.10 Hearing as CL. EX. 7 and the retroactive TTD benefits that had accrued from 12.28.09 -
12.6.10 (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 17, 017022; 017025). 
After making that unconditional payment of past due benefits, Employer then engaged in 
a very disingenuous legal maneuver and raised the doctrine of res judicata to justify its 
continuing refusal to pay Claimant the following benefits: 
1. 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefit claims that were incurred 
by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 injury but noJ adjudicated as EX. 7 at the 
9.28.10 Hearing (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 14 and EX. 15); and, 
2. 100% of all past denied mileage, per diem and lodging benefits that were not adjudicated 
at the 9.28.10 Hearing (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 16). 
The Commission's 3. 7 .12 Notice of Hearing set the remaining disputed issues in this case 
for Hearing on 5.17.12 (R., Vol. II, pp. 258-260). On 9.28.12, the Commission entered its final 
decision on the remaining disputed issues in this case and held that: 
(1) The Claimant was totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot worker; 
(2) The Claimant was entitled to a 19% whole person PPI rating with 12% of that rating 
being assigned to the Claimant's 12.18.09 low back injury and 7% being apportioned 
back to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury; 
(3) The 7% whole person rating that Dr. issued on 3.10.11 and applied 
retroactively 21-years to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back inj met all of the 
elements the PFC against the but ISIF was not liable for any of the 
Claimant's total and permanent benefits because is estopped from 
asserting 
inconsistent 
Brief l! 
is liable for 100% the Claimant's total and permanent disability benefits 
beginning when the Claimant achieved maximum medical improvement 
November of 2010; 
(5) Based on this Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 
852 (2009), Employer is liable for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of .ci:ll of 
the Claimant's past denied medieal benefits with proper credit for the amounts previously 
paid on or about 2.6.12 based on the medical bills that were adjudicated as CL. EX. 7 at 
the 9.28.10 Hearing; 
(6) Employer could ;tlQ_t use the doctrine of res judicata to avoid its Neel obligation to pay 
Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefits that were 
incurred by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial accident; 
(7) Based on this Court's holding in Neel, Employer was liable for the payment of 100% of 
~ll past denied mileage, per diem and lodging expenses itemized in Claimant's 5.17.12 
EX. 16; and 
(8) Employer was liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 
based on Employer's unreasonable refusal to pay the Claimant all undisputed worker's 
compensation benefits after the Idaho Supreme Court entered its 1.30.12 Order 
dismissing Employer's 2nct premature appeal (R., Vol. II, pp. 269-316). 
Employer filed its Motion For Reconsideration of the Commission's 9.28.12 decision on 
10.17.12 (R., Vol. II, pp. 338-349). Defendant ISIF opposed Employer's 10.17.12 Motion For 
Reconsideration on 10.30.12 (R., Vol. II, pp. 350-354). Claimant opposed Employer's 10.17.12 
Motion For Reconsideration on 10.30.12 (R., Vol. III, pp. 355-376). 
The Industrial Commission granted Employer's Motion For Reconsideration on 12.10.12 
the following to 9.28.12 decision (as amended on 12.5.12): 
(1) 
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(2) The Claimant's award of attorney's now to Employer's 
unreasonable refusal to pay Claimant his undisputed 12% whole person benefit 
award after the Supreme Court dismissed Employer's 2nd premature appeal on 1.30.12 
(R., Vol. III, pp. 443-461). 
On 12.19.12, the Claimant filed his Motion For Reconsideration of the Commission's 
12.l 0.12 Order on Reconsideration and asked the Commission to reconsider its application of 
collateral estoppel because Employer failed to prove all of the elements in the prima facie case 
(R., Vol. III, pp. 462-497). The Commission summarily denied the motion without discussion 
even though the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not listed in the Commission's 3.7.12 Notice 
of Hearing; was not raised as an affirmative defense by Employer at the commencement of the 
5.17.12 Hearing when the parties agreed Employer was relying exclusively on the doctrine of 
res judicata; not raised by the Claimant in his 7.27 .12 post-hearing Brief; not raised by Employer 
in its 8.15.12 post-hearing Reply Brief and never even discussed by the Industrial Commission in 
its original 9.28.12 decision (R., Vol. III., pp. 504-506). 
Employer then filed its 3rd appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on 1.18.13 (R., Vol. III, 
pp. 507-512). The Claimant filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal on 2.1.13 and asked the Court to 
decide other disputed issues that arose during the evolution of this case but had not been raised 
by Employer's 1.18.13 Notice of Appeal (R., Vol. III. pp. 516-525). Defendant ISIF filed its 
of Cross Appeal on 2.4.13 (R., Vol. pp. 529-532) and asked the Court to address 3 
case are not 
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12.17.10 2, 9). Employer denied this claim based 
UPS. Since the material 
facts in this case are not in dispute and all of issues presented on appeal are legal questions, 
the Claimant will not set forth a detailed statement of facts but will cite to the facts in the record 
when necessary to support the Claimant's legal arguments on the disputed issues 2• 
(III) ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Has Employer met its burden of proving that the Commission's 5.17.11 decision should 
be reversed based on the standards ofldaho Code §72-732? 
2. Has Employer met its burden of proving that the Commission's 12.5.12 decision should 
be reversed based on the standards of Idaho Code §72-732? 
3. Has Claimant met his burden of proving that the Commission's 12.10.12 Order On 
Reconsideration should be reversed based on the standards ofldaho Code §72-732? 
4. Should the Court award the Claimant attorney's fees at every stage of this "close case" 
from date of injury on 12.18.09 to the date of final decision by the Supreme Court and on 
remand pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804, I.AR. 35(a)(2) and I.A.R. 41? 
(D) STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has defined the standards of review which govern appeals from the Industrial 
Commission decisions as follows: 
The Court may set aside an order or award by the Industrial Commission if: (1) the 
commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent evidence; 
(2) the commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (3) the 
findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; or ( 4) the findings of fact do 
not as a matter of law support the order or award. LC. § 72-732; Ewins v. Allied Sec., 
138 Idaho 343, 345-346, 63 469, 471-472 (2003). This Court exercises free 
review over the Commission's legal conclusions but does not disturb factual findings 
that are supported by substantial evidence. Ewins, 13 8 Idaho at 346, 
63 P.3d at 472. "Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind 
Court views all facts and 
prevailed before 
950 1254, 1256 
2 The background facts which support the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law on the "accident" and "injury" 
issues can be located at pp. 3-7 of CL. I .19. l 0 Br. 
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(1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 
Idaho 302, 305, 179 P.3d. 265, 268 (2008). 
(E) 
1. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COMMISSION'S ERRONEOUS 
CONCLUSION THAT EMPLOYER PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
REBUT THE PREMISES PRESUMPTION AND RULE THAT CLAIMANT'S 
ACCIDENT AND INJURY AROSE OUT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW 
The Industrial Commission found in this case that there was no question that the 
Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident and injury occurred on his Employer's premises: 
There is no question that Claimant's normal workplace (other than in his truck) was 
at Arnold's Aviation at the Cascade Airport in Cascade. We find that for purposes of 
this matter, the subject accident occurred on Employer's premises. (R., Vol. I, p. 36, 
LL 14-16). 
Employer did no! appeal this finding or the Commission's ruling that the premises 
presumption applied to this case. Referee Powers applied the correct legal standard from Foust v. 
Birds Eye Div., 91Idaho418, 419, 422 P.2d 616, 617 (1967) for what the Employer must prove 
to rebut the premises presumption and correctly held that Employer failed to rebut the "premises 
presumption": 
Claimant is entitled to the presumption that his injury arose in the course of and out 
of his employment. Therefore, the burden shifts to Employer to rebut that 
presumption by proving Claimant's accident and injury did not arise out of his 
employment because it was an abnormal, unforeseeable activity that was foreign to 
his employment. See, Foust Id. (R., Vol. I, p. 24, 20-p.25, 
Commission re-wrote Referee decision, it misread 
to 
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Therefore, in order to overcome the presumption that the accident is one arising out 
of and in the course of employment, Defendant must come forward with proof 
sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the accident is not one arising 
out of and in the course of employment. If the opposing pai1y does come forward 
with such evidence, then the Commission must ascertain whether the facts are 
sufficient to demonstrate that the accident is one arising out of and in the course of 
employment without the benefit of the presumption. (R., Vol. I, p. 37, LL 17-22). 
Even if the Court assumed arguendo that that the Kessler Court's reference to I.R.E. 301 
negated this Court's holding in Foust and lowered the standard of proof for what is required to 
rebut the "premises presumption" (which the Claimant does not concede), by its express terms 
I.R.E. 301 only applies in those cases where the presumption rebuttal standard is not otherwise 
provided for by Idaho appellate decisions. 
The Foust rule is directly on point and has always defined the proper standard of proof that 
is required for Employer to rebut the "premises presumption": 
A contrary presumption, that is, that the injury arises out of and in the course of 
employment, prevails where the injury occurs on the employer's premises, as in the 
instant case and Nichols v. Godfrey, supra. (citations omitted). In the case at bar 
there is nothing to indicate that respondent, while on her employer's premises, was 
engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to her employment, as was 
the situation in In re Malmquist, 78 Idaho 117, 300 P .2d 820 (1956); Neale v. 
Weaver, 60 Idaho 41, 88 P.2d 522 (1939); and Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 253 P. 
1104 (1927). Foust v. Birds Eye Div., 91Idaho418, 419, 422 P.2d 616, 617 (1967). 
This Court has recently construed the premises presumption rule stated in Kessler, I.R.E. 
301 and Foust as being perfectly consistent: 
When an injury occurs on an employer's premises, a arises that the 
129 Idaho at 859, 934 injury arose out of and in the course 
P.2d at 32 (1997); Foust v. Birds Eye Div., 91 
(1967). Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 
Claimant I Respondent's Brief 
418, 419, P.2d 616, 617 
325, 288, 296 
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A mere 6 months after the Commission refused to apply the Foust rule in this case, the 
Commission correctly that defines what the Employer must prove to rebut 
premises presumption: 
An accident involving a worker occurring on the employer's premises is presumed to 
arise out of and in the course of employment. Foust v. Birds Eye Division of General 
Foods Com., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967). This presumption can be rebutted 
by proof that the employee, while on the employer's premises, was engaged in 
unforeseeable, abnormal activity foreign to his employment. Mudge v. GNP of 
Idaho, Inc., and Tower Insurance Company of New York, 2011 WL 6042994, LC. 
No. 2010-025109, p. 7, L. 32-p. 8, L. 1 (Filed: 11.14.11). 
Even if this Court were to ignore the Commission's adoption of the Foust standard in 
Afudge and apply the lower standard that the Commission used in this case, this Court should 
still reverse the Commission's finding that Employer rebutted the presumption because no 
reasonable person could conclude, based on the evidence presented, that Employer came forward 
with proof sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the accident is not one arising 
out of and in the course of employment. 
The Claimant gave unrefuted testimony at the 9.28.10 Hearing which explained how 
Employer's Safety Policies required him to tie the laces on his work boots (Tr. 1, p. 17, L. 22 -
p. 23, L. 19). Michael McGuire is Employer's Health and Safety Manager for the Northwest 
District who, by his own estimate, is one of the top 20 people in the entire UPS organization of 
430,000 employees who is qualified to discuss UPS's Safety Policies (McGuire 9.16.10 pre-
hearing Dep., 1 10). 
during 9 .16.10 pre-hearing deposition 
to on boots to 
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mmnmze risk of trip and fall injuries and prevent "loose or hanging" getting 
caught in moving parts or machinery (McGuire 9 .16. l 0 Dep., p. 24, L-9 - 52, 15; Dep. 
E, p. 4 and CL. 9.28.10 EX. 11, 011015-011016). 
Preston Dax Wilkinson was the Claimant's Supervisor and Business Manager (Tr. 1, p. 84, 
LI. 18-19). Mr. Wilkinson gave unrefuted testimony at the 9.28.10 Hearing confirming that he 
had read all of Mr. McGuire's 9 .16.10 pre-hearing deposition transcript and agreed 100°1<> with 
all of Mr. McGuire's testimony about Employer's Safety Policies (Tr. 1 , p. 85, LL 5-10). 
The unrefuted sworn testimony from the Claimant, Mr. McGuire and Mr. Wilkinson 
provides overwhelming evidence that Claimant was performing an act required by his job and 
was not engaged in some abnormal, unforeseeable act that was foreign to his employment when 
he bent down to tie the laces on his work boots on his Employer's premises on 12.18.09. Based 
on this unrefuted evidence, no reasonable mind could reach the conclusion that Employer came 
forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the premises presumption. 
The Court should give Claimant the benefit of the premises presumption and rule as a 
matter of law that Claimant's accident and injury arose out of his employment. 
Where there is no dispute in the evidence and it is not reasonably susceptible of more 
than one inference, the question of whether an accident to a workman arose out of 
and in the course of employment is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact 
and may be reviewed by this court. Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 351, 252 P.2d 
1049, 1050 (1953). Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 253, 16 P.3d 926, 
929 (2000) (emphasis supplied). 
Commission explained the legal 
came as 
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If the opposing party does come forward with such evidence, then Commission 
must ascertain whether the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that the accident is one 
arising out of and the course employment without the benefit of the 
presumption (R., Vol. I, p. 37, Ll. 20-22). 
The converse must likewise be true. In cases like this where the Employer has failed to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, then by its own logic the 
Commission is not required to go any further to ascertain whether the facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate that the accident is one arising out of and in the course of employment because the 
"arise out of' question has already been decided as a matter of law by proper application of the 
presumption. To hold otherwise and still require the Claimant to adduce evidence on the "arise 
out of' question after he has already received the benefit of the presumption, would nullify the 
effect of the presumption and make it absolutely meaningless. 
The Commission's description of the legal effect of failing to rebut the presumption is 
consistent with this Court's holding in Kessler and I.R.E. 301 which explains the effect of failure 
to rebut the presumption as follows: 
If the party against whom a presumption operates fails to meet the burden of going 
forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved. (I.R.E. 30l(a)). 
The fact which shall be deemed proved by Employer's failure to rebut the premises 
presumption in this case is that the Claimant's injury "arose out of' his employment. Since 
Claimant is entitled to a 
ruling that his injury "arose out of his Based on umque 
this case, lS no invitation to 
+ case to out 
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the great of authority, injuries sustained by an employee upon premises 
owned or controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and 
the course of the employment. Annotation, 49 426-436(6) .... 
In Burchett v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., supra, this court affirmed a determination 
that an employee who sustained an injury on the employer's premises as a result of a 
fall on a slippery walkway was entitled to compensation. Therein =-:.:..=:::___:::="--="'-= 
the accident was one that arose out of and in the course of 
employment. Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 350-351, 411 P.2d 763, 765-766 
(1966) (emphasis supplied). 
The Commission not only committed plain legal error by refusing to apply the Foust 
standard to determine whether Employer had rebutted the premises presumption, the 
Commission compounded that error by formulating legal conclusions that were not supported by 
any substantial and competent evidence in the record: 
Regardless, we think the question of the current status of the Foust presumption is 
mooted in this case in view of our conclusion that Defendant's have come forward 
with evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the subject 
accident is not one arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 38, LL 20-23) (emphasis supplied). 
Without citing any facts in the record to support its legal conclusion that Employer had 
come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the Commission just formulated 
another legal conclusion and then looped the first conclusion with the second conclusion: 
Employer has a reasonable expectation that Claimant will prepare himself such that 
when he arrives at the work site, he is ready to go to work. Such pre-work 
preparations such as eating and dressing are not ordinarily part of the work that a 
worker is paid to perform, and therefore, such activities are not in the "course" of 
employment. That chooses, for reasons of personal convenience, to 
perfom1 one activities at the place, as opposed to his home, 
arguably this activity into the "course" Claimant's 
Claimant I Brief 
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on the course question 
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Commission did not cite any legal authority to support its conclusion that an 
Employer's "reasonable expectations" can the premises presumption. Furthermore, 
Commission's finding Employer had a "reasonable expectation" that Claimant would tie his 
work boot laces before he entered upon his Employer's premises is directly contradicted by 
Employer's testimony. 
Mike McGuire gave unrefuted testimony in his pre-hearing deposition that Employer 
never communicated its expectations that its employee were required to tie their boot laces 
before entering upon the Employer's premises in a written policy, procedure, standard, rule or 
guideline (McGuire Dep., p. 49, LI. 8-11; p. 50, LL 11-15; p. 55, L. 16 p. 56, L. 1). 
To be objectively reasonable, "[t]he employer's expectations must be communicated 
to the employee unless they flow naturally from the employment relationship." 
Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 436, 974 P.2d 78, 82 (1999). Sadid v. 
Idaho State University, _Idaho_, 294 P.3d 1100, 1107 (2013). 
The Commission also based its conclusion that Employer had met its Foust burden of 
rebutting the "premises presumption" by stating another erroneous legal conclusion that was 
directly contradicted by the Commission's own subsequent findings: 
overcome 
Similarly, the risk of injury to which Claimant was evidently exposed is 
arguably a common risk, with no particular association to Claimant's 
employment. We therefore conclude that Defendants have overcome 
presumption, leaving the Commission to consider whether the evidence 
supports a finding that Claimant has met his burden of 
occurrence of an accident arising out of and in course of 
(R., Vol. I, p. 39, LL 3-7) (emphasis supplied). 
Commission did not any to support its 
to a was to 
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presumption, Commission found that Claimant's job exposed to an 
associated or 
when he bent over to tie his work boot laces on 12.18.09 (R., Vol. I, p. 45, LI. 20-23; p. 46, LL 6-
12 and LL 16-20; 47, LL 10-12 and p. 49, LL 24-26). 
The Court should reverse the Commission's erroneous conclusion of law that Employer 
successfully rebutted the premises presumption because that conclusion was based on the wrong 
legal standard in direct violation of this Court's holding in Foust 3 and based on erroneous legal 
conclusions and factual findings that were directly contradicted by the Commission's own 
findings. Even if this Court determines that proper application of the premises presumption does 
not entitle the Claimant to a ruling that his accident and injury "arose out of' his employment as 
a matter of law, the Court should still affirm the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision 
because Employer has failed to satisfy the appellate standards set forth in Idaho Code §72-732. 
2. THE COURT SHOULD. AFFIRM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 5.17.11 
AROSE OUT OF EMPLOYMENT RULING BECAUSE EMPLOYER FAILED TO 
PROVE THAT THE COMiy1ISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE . NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY 
IDAHO CODE 72-73lQ} 
Idaho code §72-732(1) requires Employer to prove that the Commission's findings of fact 
were not supported by substantial competent evidence in order to set aside the Commission's 
5.17.11 decision. Employer has only challenged 1 finding of fact; i.e., that "the Industrial 
Commission by asserting UPS not dispute an accident or injury as defined Idaho 
occurred" 13 17, 8-9). exactly 
opposite to meet 
3 The Commission adopted the Foust rule in 6 months later. 
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732(1). 
Employer s 
12.18.09 "injury" did not "arise out of' his employment with UPS (CL. 9.28.l 0 8, 008001, 
EX. 9, 009006). Employer did not dispute that the Claimant suffered an accident and injury that 
occurred during the course of his employment. Based on the express language of Employer's 
original 1.8.10 denial and its 2.26.10 secondary denial, the Industrial Commission had 
substantial and competent evidence to conclude that Employer did not dispute that Claimant 
suffered an accident and injury in the course of his employment. The Court should not disturb 
those findings on appeal. 
The Industrial Commission described the term "accident" as "a term of art" in its 5 .1 7 .11 
decision: 
The term "accident" is a term of art under the Idaho Workers' Compensation law, 
and is defined at I.C. § 72-102(18)(b) as follows: "Accident" means an unexpected, 
undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected with the 
industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time when and 
place where it occurred, causing an injury. Here, it is clear that the mishap 
described by Claimant is one that would qualify as an "accident" under the 
statutory scheme. See Wynn v. JR. Simplot Company, 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 
(1983); Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002); Page v. 
1\1cCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005). Moreover, there is no 
dispute that Claimant's injuries are causally related to accident. (R., Vol. I, 
p. 39, LL 9-18) (emphasis supplied). 
"accident" and "injury" in the heading of argument 2 on page 12 
was as as terms art went. 
the Claimant was 
over to on 
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a "pop" his back. did argue that Claimant's accident was 
connected industry which it occurred. did argue that Claimant failed to 
reasonably locate the time and place where his "accident" occurred. Employer did got argue that 
the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident did not "cause" his low back "injury. Employer conceded the 
"in the course of employment" issue. 
Based on the express language of its 2 written denials and Employer's failure to dispute 
that Claimant suffered an "accident" and "injury" in its 12.17.10 Brief, the Commission clearly 
had substantial and competent evidence to support its finding that Employer has never 
disputed that Claimant suffered an accident and injury in the course of his employment. Even if 
Employer had disputed that Claimant suffered an accident and injury in the course of his 
employment, the Industrial Commission had substantial and competent evidence to support its 
conclusion that Claimant suffered an accident and injury in the course of his employment on 
12.18.09 when he bent over to tie the laces on his work boots and felt a "pop" in his low back 4• 
Since Employer failed to prove that the Commission's findings of fact were not supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, there is no basis for this Court to set aside the 
Commission's findings pursuant to Idaho Code §72-732(1). 
3. 
that 
not as a matter 5. 7.11 
4 See background facts set forth at pp. 3-7 of CL. l.19.10 Br. 
Claimant I Brief 24 
from page 16 to page 33 of its 4.24.13 appellate Employer to a 
which did not as a matter of support the Commission's 5.17. 1 "arose out of' 
ruling. 
The Industrial Commission's use of the positional risk doctrine given findings 
was in error, and its 2011 Decision warrants reversal. (ER. 4.24.13 App. Br., p. 33, 
LL 7-8). 
What findings? Employer did not identify a single finding of fact which did not as a matter 
of law support the Commission's 5.17.11 ruling on the "arose out of' employment question. 
Therefore, this Court cannot conduct effective appellate review. Even if Employer had identified 
specific findings of fact which did not support the Commission's ruling, Employer's argument 
would still fail to meet the standards of Idaho Code §72-732(4) because it is very clear that all of 
the Commission's findings supported its ruling that Claimant's injury arose out of his 
employment: 
Here, the risk of injury in question ~ connected to the employment because it was 
encountered by Claimant as result of the Claimant's performance of a task that was 
either part of his work, or reasonably incidental thereto. To conclude, as we do, that 
the risk of bending over to tie one's shoe preparatory to beginning the workday is a 
work-connected risk, is entirely consistent with the proposition that an accident does 
not arise out of employment unless there is proof of a causal connection between the 
conditions under which the work must be performed and the resulting injury. 
Claimant had demonstrated, and no rational person would disagree, that anyone 
whose job includes the requirement of carrying boxes all day, frequently in a way 
that obscures his view of the ground immediately in front of him, would do well to 
keep his shoes tied. It strains credulity to suggest that the action Claimant took 
preparatory to the start of his shift did not confer a benefit upon Employer by 
reducing the chances Claimant would suffer a trip and fall. It strains credulity to 
suggest that risk injury associated with the tying the shoelaces was not 
therefore one as a natural incident Claimant to 
his 
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evidence is such it cannot be asce1iained whether Claimant's injury was 
occasioned as a result of a risk personal to him versus an employment connected 
(R., I, p. 45, 20- p. 45, L. 12). 
However, true this may be, the fact of the matter is that Claimant suffered this 
particular injury as the result of his attempts to accommodate the requirements of his 
job. Because the Claimant was necessarily required to tie his shoelaces before 
starting work, his job clearly created an actual risk which ultimately resulted in 
Claimant's injury. (R., Vol. I, p. 46, LL 16-20). 
Even though we have found that Claimant's employment did, indeed, subject him to 
an actual risk of injury due to workplace demands which required of him that his 
shoelaces be tied, the "arising" test explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, 
may still present an obstacle to the claim. (R., Vol. I, p. 47, LL 10-13). 
Therefore, after Spivey, it seems clear that where the risk of injury is one to which 
claimant is equally exposed both in, and without, his employment, the resulting 
injury is one which will be deemed to arise out of employment. This rule embraces 
coverage for both neutral and equal risks. However, it is clear that before benefits are 
payable, it must be demonstrated that claimant actually was exposed to the risk in 
question in the course of his employment, and that exposure to that risk led to the 
lllJUry. 
In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely not a 
neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the work 
that Claimant was hired to perform. However, like a true "neutral" risk, it is a risk of 
injury to which Claimant was equally exposed apart from his employment. Spivey v. 
Novartis Seed, Inc., supra, makes it clear that injuries resulting from both types of 
risks so characterized should be deemed to arise out of employment. To the extent 
that the longstanding rule explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, is to the 
contrary, we perceive that rule is overruled by Spivey. Quite apart from the question 
of whether or not Claimant is entitled to a presumption favoring the compensability 
of this claim, the evidence establishes that Claimant has satisfied his burden of 
proving the occurrence of an accident both arising out and in the course of 
employment (R., Vol. I, 49, 18 - p. 50, L. 7 ). 
findings fact supported its ruling on "arose out of 
as a matter to meet its 
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§72-732( 4) and there is no basis for this to set aside Commission's 5.17.11 
WHEN THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PROPERLY APPLIED TO 
THIS COURT'S MODERN HOLDINGS WHICH REQUIRE A LIBERAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS "ACCIDENT" AND "INJURY", THERE IS NO 
DOUBT THAT THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF_ FACT SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S RULING ON THE "AROSE OUT OF" EMPLOYMENT QUESTION 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Employer has accused this Court of misreading the plain language of Idaho Code §72-
102(18) and legislating from the bench in Spivey in order to expand the scope of the terms 
"accident" and "injury" beyond what the legislature intended (ER 4.24.13 App. Br., p. 19, LL 19-
21; p. 26, LL 15-18; p. 28, L. 20 p. 29, L. 17). The irony of Employer's argument must be 
pointed out. Although Employer uses euphemistic language to conceal its true objective in this 
case, what the Employer is really asking this Court to do is judicially re-write the plain definition 
of the terms accident and injury set forth in Idaho Code §72-102(18) to include a new element 
in the PLi!!l_a facie case of the accident I injury theory which would require the Claimant to 
prove that he was exposed to a "greater risk" while performing an actual job duty that was 
peculiar to and characteristic of the job duty itself and _not a common risk that he would be 
equally exposed to outside of work in order to have a compensable accident I injury claim that 
"arose out of' his employment 12.17.10 post-hearing brief, 13, 13-15; p. 20, 7-8). 
The Court should decline invitation to survey 39 cases dating back 82 years 
Professor Larson's treatise can reject "greater risk" argument by 
s a 
to terms case. 
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This Court began its trend of rejecting Employer's attempts to give an 
narrow terms accident and injury in v. 
Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983). 
Commission or Simplot's ~'.:'.:_"~"~'".L-'."=:_:_o~~::.:-:::_~~:.i­
~~~,~~~~~"-"-"-'~ in view of the circumstances presented in the instant case ... 
It is enough to note that claimant here, as indicated by the medical evidence, suffered 
his injury at a particular time, at a particular place, while engaged in his normal and 
ordinary work for his employer. The fact that Wynn's spine may have been weak 
and predisposed him to a ruptured disc does not prevent an award since our 
compensation law does not limit awards to workmen who, prior to injury, were 
in sound condition and perfect health. Rather, an employer takes an employee 
as he finds him .... 
As this Court has repeatedly stated, "If the claimant be engaged in his ordinary usual 
work and the strain of such labor becomes sufficient to overcome the resistance of 
the claimant's body and causes an injury, the injury is compensable." Whipple v. 
Brundage, 80 Idaho 193, 327 P.2d 383 (1958); Lewis v. Dept. of Law Enforcement, 
79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d 976 (1957) .... 
We reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission and remand the cause to the 
Commission for the entry of an appropriate award to claimant. Costs to appellant. 
Wynn, supra, 105 Idaho l 04 -105, 666 P. 2d 631-632 (emphasis supplied). 
In Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 16 P.3d 926 (2000), this Court clearly 
rejected Employer's argument that the Claimant must prove that he was exposed to a "greater 
error when it concluded 
<>hudu not furtherance of 
which the 
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decided upon its own attendant facts and circumstances under a liberal 
construction of the Worker's Compensation Act. Beebe v. Horton, 77 
Idaho 388, 390, 293 P.2d 661, 662 (1956). hold that the Commission 
erred in concluding that Gage's injury did not arise out of and in the course 
of her employment. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision 
denying worker's compensation benefits. id. 135 Idaho 254, 16 P.3d 930 
(emphasis supplied). 
In Page v. 1\fcCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005), the Court affirmed 
its holding in Gage that the Claimant does noj: need to be exposed to a "greater risk" of injury 
while performing an actual job duty to prove a compensable accident I injury claim: 
The Commission's reliance on Perez is misplaced and Spivey provides a more 
analogous analysis. The Commission erred in concluding that Page did not 
experience an "accident" when she rose from the chair. 
Because this case will be remanded to the Commission, we note two additional 
concerns regarding the injury at issue here. The testimony of two physicians 
establishes that while the meniscus tear could have happened at any time, based 
on the "grabbing," pain and locking of the knee, the probability is that it 
happened at the time Page rose from the chair. Case law holds that doubts about 
an injury arising out of and in the course of employment are resolved in favor of 
the claimant. Dinius, 133 Idaho at 574, 990 P.2d at 740. Id. 141 Idaho 347-348, 
109 P.3d 1089-1090. 
The Page Court found that that the facts presented were closely analogous to Spivey even 
though the Claimant in Page was clearly not performing an actual job duty when she suffered 
her accident and injury while rising from a chair in the break-room. The Court made it very 
clear that over whether an accident I injury arose out employment must 
Just like the Claimants in Gage, Spivey and Page I, 
this case can point to the specific act bending over to laces 
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on Employer's premises at 6:30 AM on 12.18.09 he felt a "pop" in his low back 
by severe pain as source of his "accident" back "injury" 5. 
Employer argued to the Commission that this Court's analysis in Page was flawed and 
had no precedential value because the Court failed to discuss whether the Claimant's injury was 
connected with her employment or arose out of her employment (ER. 12.17.10 Br., p. 15, LL 18-
15). Employer is really arguing that this Court should narrow the definitions of "accident" and 
"injury" to require the Claimant to prove that he was exposed to a greater risk while performing 
an actual job duty in order for his injury to be connected with his employment and arise out of 
his employment. A plain reading of the clear language of the statute refutes Employer's 
argument: 
An analysis of whether the accident requirement has been met must begin with a 
review of the relevant statutory language. Idaho Code section 72-102( 17)(b) 
defines accident as "an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or 
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can 
be reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an 
injury." An injury is defined as "a personal injury caused by an accident arising 
out of and in the course of any employment covered by the worker's 
compensation law." I.C. § 72-102(17)(a). Whether an employee is entitled to 
compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act requires that the injury 
must have been caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course of any 
employment." Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 
P.2d 738, 740 (1999) (citations omitted); Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting, 128 
Idaho 747, 918 P.2d 1192 (1996). "The words 'out of have been held to refer to 
the origin and cause of the accident and the words the course of refer to the 
time, place, and the circumstances under the occurred." Dinius, 
133 Idaho at 574, 990 P.2d at 740 omitted). If there is doubt 
surrounding accident arose out and course 
employment, the matter be employee. Id. (citations 
See background facts set forth at pp. 3-7 of Claimant's 1l.19.i0 Brief. 
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employer an employee as it him or her; a preexisting infirmity 
does not eliminate the opportunity for a worker's compensation claim provided 
the employment aggravated or accelerated the injury for which compensation is 
sought. Wynn v. JR. Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 104, 666 P.2d 629, 631 
(1983). Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 33, 43 P.3d 788, 792 
(2002). Ibid. 141 Idaho 347, 109 P.3d 1089. 
The Page Court did not require the Claimant to prove that she was performing an actual 
job duty that exposed her to a "greater risk" when she suffered her accident and injury. This 
has never been the law in Idaho: 
Plaintiff did not have to be actually engaged in the performance of the particular 
tasks of her employment at the time of the accident to have it arise out of and in 
the course of her employment. Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 349, 411 P.2d 
763, 765 (1966). 
The Page I Court relied heavily on the closely analogous facts of Spivey v. Novartis Seed, 
13 7 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002) when it reversed the Commission's denial of benefits. The 
Spivey Court's rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine is the reason why Employer brought this 
test case before the Court on appeal (ER. 4.24.13 Br., p. 21, LL 7-8; p. 33, Ll. 7-8). 
The Commission determined that the record supported the decision and declined 
defendants' 'invitation to introduce risk analysis from the occupational disease 
legal theory into the accident and injury legal theory.' Id. 137 Idaho 32, 43 P.3d 791 
(emphasis supplied) .... 
Appellants additionally urge that the Commission erred in its refusal to utilize a 
greater risk analysis in this case when determining whether the respondent was 
entitled to benefits .... Because her job did not place her at greater risk for injury 
than her daily routine, appellants contend that there is not substantial and competent 
L'"""''"'"' to Commission's findings. 
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In this case, the appellants suggest a return to the rationale of Wells 
Spivey to that her job duties at a for 
that encountered by the general public performing the same physical motions. 
However, a greater analysis is no of a claimant in light of 
A1ayo and Kessler . ... 
The respondent, Spivey, met her burden by establishing that she sustained an 
injury that resulted an accident that arose out of and in the course of her 
employment. A greater risk analysis is not required within the context 
accident/injury cases to determine a compensable injury. Ibid, 137 Idaho 35, 43 
P.3d 794 (emphasis supplied). 
This Court clearly held in Spivey that the "greater risk" doctrine cannot be applied to 
accident I injury claims and that holding is not the subject of legitimate debate by reasonable 
minds. Idaho Employers have had 11 years to come to the realization that this Court has no 
intention of overruling Spivey. 
Since Spivey was decided in 2002, this Court has cited its holding in Spivey with 
approval in at least 8 different cases including, Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477, 
95 P.3d 628 (2004); Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141Idaho342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005); Clarkv. 
Truss, 142 Idaho 404, 128 P. 3d 941 (2006); Hutton v. Manpower, Inc., 143 Idaho 573, 149 P.3d 
848 (2006); Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008); Fife v. 
Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 260 P.3d 1180 (2011); Henry v. Department of Correction, 
Docket No. 39039 (Filed: 1.23.13) and Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 39337 
(Filed: 4.26.13). 
on application this s I 
and respectfully s 
to cases to 
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language of Code §72-102(18) inject a an 
element into the case proving a compensable accident I injury claim. 
Employer has failed to meet its burden of proving under Idaho Code §72-732( 4) that the 
Commission's findings of fact do not as a matter of law support its ruling that the Claimant's 
injury "arose out of his employment". The Court does not even need to perform a "greater risk" 
analysis in order to affirm the Commission's ruling. 
5. EMPLOYER HAD AN OBLIGATION TO PROMPTLY COMPLY WITH THE 
--- - -
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 5.17.11 ORDER AND 12.8.11 ORDER AND PAY ALL 
- "" __ _ 
BENEFITS ORDERED 
When the legislature adopted the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, it granted exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Industrial Commission to resolve all disputes arising under the Act. (See 
Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 906, 980 P.2d 566, 570 (1999) (Van Tine II)). 
The legislature has protected the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction by instructing the Courts 
that they do not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the Commission in the performance of its 
duties: 
72-733. Limited jurisdiction of courts. Except as herein provided, no court of this 
state shall have jurisdiction to review, vacate, set aside, reverse, revise, correct, 
amend or annul any order or award of the commission, or to suspend or delay the 
execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with the commission 
in the performance of its duties. 
If the Courts of this state cannot Commission in the performance it its 
duties, the cannot to act impunity refuse to comply 
Commission's a requested 
5. 7.11 not to it 
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Commission's exclusive jurisdiction by pointing out the Commission had 
to own Vol. I, p. 12-1 (emphasis 
supplied). 
Employer's refusal to comply with the Commission's Orders left the Claimant without an 
effective legal remedy since this Court had already determined in its 7.27.11 Order Dismissing 
Appeal (R., Vol. I, p. 74-75) and 8.15.11 Order Denying Motion For Clarification (R., Vol. I, p. 
76) that the Commission's 5.17.11 Order was not a final and appealable Order. The Claimant 
could not file the 5 .17 .11 Order with the District Court and seek enforcement against Employer's 
assets pursuant to Idaho Code §72-735. The Claimant asks this Court for an Order which 
requires Employer to comply with all of the Industrial Commission's Orders and describes the 
consequences of non-compliance. 
6. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.5.12 
ORDER APPORTIONING 7% OF THE CLAIMANT'S 19% PPI RATING BACK TO 
THE CLAIMANT'S 10.22.90 LOW BACK INJURY BECAUSE THAT RATING WAS 
BASED ON DR. FRIZZELL'S 3.10.11 PPI I APPORTIONMENT OPINION WHICH 
LACKED A PROPER FOUNDATION OF SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
--------- -·-~-·---·- ·----·~ 
EVIDENCE? 
The Industrial Commission concluded that the Claimant should receive a 7% whole 
person PPI rating for his 10.22.90 low back injury based on Dr. Frizzell's 3.10.11 apportionment 
of medical opinion (R., Vol. III, p. 421, LL 15-18). This Court should reverse the 
Commission's decision to assign of the Claimant's 19% whole person rating 2 
to 10.22.90 back injury because Dr. Frizzell's 7% 
as 
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a. Dr. Frizzell originally opined in his 12.6.10 PPI report that 0% of the Claimant's 20% 
PPI rating should be apportioned to the Claimant's 10.22.90 injury because "he was 
released to full duty without permanent physical impairment or restrictions" (CL. 
5.17.12 EX. 1, 001089); 
b. Dr. Frizzell based 100% of his 12.6.10 20% PPI rating and 100% of his 3.10.11 19% 
whole person PPI rating on 5 PPI rating factors from the 5111 Edition of the AMA 
GUIDES which were all due exclusively to the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial injury 
(CL. 5.17.12 EX. 1, 001089). The first 2 PPI rating factors were based exclusively on 
the 2 back surgeries that the Claimant had to undergo as the direct result of his 
12.18.09 industrial accident and totaled 14%. The final 3 PPI factors were all based 
on Claimant's Range of Motion (ROM) deficits which were not due to Claimant's 
10.22.90 low back injury but due to his 12.18.09 injury (CL. 5.17.12. EX. 1, 001109) 
(Frizzell Dep. p. 24, LL 2-8). 
c. Dr. Frizzell did not properly follow the apportionment methodology of the AMA 
GUIDES. Even though Dr. Frizzell stated in his 6.27.11 letter that all 3-steps in the 
apportionment methodology had been met (Cl. 5.17.12 EX 1, 001109), when he was 
asked to explain that bald conclusion during his 6.4.12 post-hearing deposition, Dr. 
Frizzell responded with "No, I can't confirm that" (Frizzell Depo. p. 22, L. 7 - p. 23, 
L4). The Industrial Commission has historically rejected apportionment of PPI 
opinions based on the 5th Edition of the AMA GUIDES in cases where the rating 
physician failed to specifically follow the 3-step apportionment protocol set forth on 
page 11 of the 5th Edition (As Claimant points out, the AMA Guides are instructive 
regarding apportionment .... Dr. Phillips failed to address the "protocol" established by 
the Guides and, hence, his apportionment analysis lacks credence. (See Moncada v. 
Gonzalez, 2007 WL 1904252, LC. No. 2004-010943, ~ 2-13 on pp. 7-8, (Filed: 
4.24.07). 
d. Dr. Frizzell admitted during his 6.4.12 post-hearing deposition that the 7% PPI rating 
that he assigned to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury did not meet the PPI 
criteria of Idaho Code §72-424 because there was no proof in this case that the 
Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury had an adverse impact on the Claimant's 
personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as self-care, communication, 
normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, nonspecialized activities 
of bodily members Depo. p. 28, 17 
e. 
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be made prior to determination of permanent impairment, which cannot be 
evaluated until maximum medical improvement has been reached. See I.C. §§ 72-
422, 424. v. Depot, 152 Idaho 605, 609, 272 P.3d 577, 581 12). 
f. Dr. Frizzell admitted during his 6.4.10 post-hearing deposition that the 5th Edition of 
the AMA GUIDES was not in effect when the Claimant achieved MMI from his 
10.22.90 low back injury and admitted that he did not know if the Claimant would 
have qualified for a PPI rating based on the edition of the AMA GUIDES that was in 
effect when the Claimant achieved MMI from his 10.22.90 injury (Frizzell Depo., p. 
21, Ll. 5 - p. 22, L. 6). 
g. Since UPS's own Independent Medical Evaluator (IME) physician, Richard Knoebel, 
M.D., evaluated the Claimant when he achieved MMI from his 10.22.90 injury on 
4.2.91, Dr. Knoebel's 0% PPI rating was more reliable than the 7% PPI rating that Dr. 
Frizzell issued 21 years later on 3 .10 .11. (CL. 5 .1 7.12 EX. 1, 00I019 and 001024). 
Since the Commission based its 7% PPI rating on Dr. Frizzell's 3.10.11 opinion which 
was not based on a proper foundation of substantial and competent evidence, the Court should 
reverse the Commission's finding that a 7% PPI rating should have been assigned to the 
Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury. 
7. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.5.10 
FINDING THAT THE 7% PPI RATING THAT DR. FRIZZELL ISSUED WAS A 
"SUBJECTIVE HINDRANCE" TO EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO THE CLAIMANT'S 
12.18.09 ACCIDENT I INJ!JRY 
The Commission based its finding that the Claimant's other preexisting impairments 
were not subjective hindrances to employment on the significant factor that no physician had 
issued the Claimant any permanent physical restrictions for those impairments prior to the 
Claimant's 12.18.09 p. 7-13). same logic applies to Claimant's 
10.22.90 
0.22.00 not 
10 3, s 
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evaluator, Dr. Knoebel, concluded the Claimant reached 10.22.90 low 
injury on 4.2.91 that not have or 
.~ .. v .. ., from his 10.22.90 low back injury and released the Claimant to return to full duty 
unrestricted work (003019-003020 and 003024). 
The Industrial Commission has held that a Claimant cannot prove disability above 
impairment if the Claimant does not have any permanent physical restrictions that adversely 
impact his functional capacity: 
Absent some functional loss, it is hard to conceive of a factual scenario that would 
support an award of disability over and above impairment; if the injured worker is 
physically capable of performing the same types of physical activities as he 
performed prior to the industrial accident, then neither wage loss nor loss of access to 
the labor market is implicated. Wright v. Hagadone Photography, 2019 WL 
3011038, LC. No. 2004-507331, ~ 51(Filed:7.16.10). 
Since the Claimant was released to perform full duty work without any restrictions after 
his 10.22.90 low back injury and succeeded in the performance of very heavy work for UPS for 
approximately 19 years until his 12.18.09 injury, the Commission did not have any substantial 
and competent evidence in the record to support its conclusion the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back 
injury was a subjective hindrance. 
Although the absence of restrictions was a significant which supported the 
Commission's finding that the Claimant's other pre-existing impairments were not subjective 
Commission ignored this to rely on 
restrictions issued 21-years s 1 
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With respect to the 1990 low back injury, addition to determining 
entitled to a 7% rating for 1nJury, Frizzell felt it appropriate 
following that injury Claimant should have observed certain limitations/restrictions 
in order to protect his back from further injury. He proposed that Claimant should 
avoid maximum lifting of over 75 pounds. The sensibility of this recommendation is 
well borne out by Claimant's subsequent history. Although Claimant returned to 
unrestricted work following the 1990 low back injury, he did not stay symptom free 
(R., Vol. III, p. 423, LL 14-20). 
This Court should reverse the Commission's reliance on Dr. Frizzell's restrictions because 
those restrictions were not based on a proper foundation of substantial and competent evidence 
as demonstrated by the following summary: 
a. Prior to issuing his hypothetical 9 .19 .11 restrictions, Dr. Frizzell had already issued 3 
prior opinions stating unequivocally that 100% of the Claimant's restrictions were due 
exclusively to his 12.18.09 industrial accident and Claimant did not have any restrictions 
related to his 10.22.90 low back injury (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 1, 001090; 001102 and 001108-
001109); 
b. Dr. Frizzell could not explain during his post-hearing deposition what facts, legal analysis 
or methodology in the 36-page legal decision that he received from Employer's counsel 
caused him to change his 3 prior opinions and issue hypothetical restrictions for the 
Claimant's 10.22.90 injury (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 1, 001114-001116). Dr. Frizzell could not 
even confirm that he read the decision (Frizzell 6.4.12 Depo., p. 31, L. 4 - p. 32, L. 11 ). 
c. Dr. Frizzell' s 9 .19 .11 hypothetical restrictions were directly contradicted by the 
Claimant's unrefuted hearing testimony which established that his 10.22.90 low back 
injury did not interfere with his ability to perform the essential functions of job for UPS; 
that all of his attending physicians who treated him for his preexisting injuries had 
released him to return to full duty unrestricted work; that he never asked UPS to make 
any job modifications based on his preexisting impairments and UPS never imposed any 
job modifications because of his preexisting impairments (Tr. 2, p. 35, 14 - p. 52, L. 
lO)(Tr. 2, p. 157, 14- 160, L 13). 
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modify the essential functions of a job to accommodate any injured employee's physical 
disability (ISIF K, p. 37, L. 23- p. 38, L. 5). Wilkinson confirmed that none 
Claimant's prior physical injuries I impairments adversely impacted his ability to 
perform the essential duties of his Package Driver job (ISIF EX. K, p. 38, L.25 -p. 39, 
14). 
e. The Commission has expressed concern in other cases about hypothetical restrictions 
are applied retroactively as if they had always been in place (The Referee finds the 
panel's approach, and Mr. Jordan's reliance upon it, flawed in that it formulates work 
restrictions that did not previously exist, applies them retroactively, then analyzes 
Claimant's condition as though the restrictions had always been in place). Sommer v. 
ISJF, 2008 WL 3090703, I.C. No. 2001-012652 (Filed 7.7.08). 
The Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's conclusion that the Claimant's 
10.22.90 low back impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment because that 
conclusion was based on Dr. Frizzell's opinion that was not supported by a proper foundation 
and directly contradicted by the reality of Claimant's ability to perform heavy physical labor for 
19 years prior to his 12.18.09 injury. 
8. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING 
THAT THE CLAIMANT'S 3.10.11 7% IMPAIRMENT "COMBINED WITH" THE 
- " ·--- . -·-··--· ' ·-~~-~·-·---~-~----
CLAIMANT'S 12.18.09 ACCIDENT I INJURY TO CAUSE THE CLAIMANT TO 
BECOME TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED 
The Commission relied on the following factors to support its erroneous conclusion that 
the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury "combined with" his 12.18.09 industrial injury to cause 
total and permanent disability: 
a. The 7°!o PPI Rating anci;Restrictions That Dr. f'tlzzell issued in 2011 
(R., Vol. 425, LL 8-11). 
The 7% the issued 2011 were not on a 
were 
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the reality of Claimant's ability to perform unrestricted physical labor for 19 years until 
his 12.18.09 injury. 
b. Claimant was not symptom free in the years imme<:liately preceding the 12.18.09 accident 
(R., Vol. III, p. 425, L. 14-15). 
The record in this case does not contain any medical causation opinion from any 
doctor which established that Claimant's episodic "sore back" over a 26-year career with UPS 
was due specifically to his 10.22.90 L4-5 disc injury. The Commission formulated its own 
medical causation opinion when it concluded that Claimant's episodic low back pain over the 
years was caused specifically by his 10.22.90 L4-5 low back injury. This Court held in 1\1azzone 
v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 39337 (Filed: 4.26.13) that it is improper for the 
Commission to formulate its own medical opinions where medical evidence is lacking in the 
record. 
c. Claimant attempted to find ways to do his job wl}ic,:heased th~<i~mands onfil~_Qack 
(R., Vol. III, p. 425, L. 15-16). 
The Commission based its finding that Claimant self-modified his job to accommodate 
his "sore back" on: (1) a box marked "no" in a 3.15.06 Supervisor's Ride Along Report 
(Employer 5.17.12 EX. 15, p.120); (2) a box marked "no" in a 7.20.09 report (Employer's 
5.17.12 EX. 15, p. 127); and (3) a hand written hearsay statement at the bottom of a 7.29.08 
accusing of "[ e ]excessive backing due to protectiveness of sore back" 
124). 
not accept 3 references to a 26 
career to to 
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because of his 10.22.90 back injury - especially given the fact that Claimant's 
Supervisor, Wilkinson, admitted during 5.8.12 pre-hearing deposition sees a 
tendency in all UPS Package Car Drivers to back their vehicles as close to the delivery point as 
possible so they don't have to carry the packages as far (Wilkinson, 5.8.12 Depo., p. 44, LL 19-
22). 
Employer did not present any medical causation evidence to the Commission which 
established that the "sore back" referred to in the 7.29.08 ride-along-report was caused by the 
Claimant's 10.22.90 L4-5 back injury. The Claimant's "sore back" could have been caused by 
any number of soft tissue problems ranging from the top of his thoracic spine at T-1 to the 
bottom of his lumbar spine at L5-S 1. Since no doctor established a causal relationship between 
the "sore back" hearsay statement in the 7.29.08 report and Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury, 
the Commission had to manufacture its own medical causation opinion in order to conclude 
that residuals from the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury are what caused him to self-modify 
his job through "excessive backing." The Court should reverse the Commission's "combined 
with" finding because it was based on the Commission's own medical causation opinions in 
direct violation of this Court's holding in Afazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 3933 7 
(Filed: 4.26.13). 
d. The mechanics of the ClaimaI1t's 12.18.09 bending~9ver to tie the laces on his work boots 
injury were such a "trivial exercise" that they could not have caused Claimant's 12.18.09 
disc herniatio11 aQ.§_~111-"C:laimant' s signi:fiQ<!Ilt preexisting condition at IA-~ 
(R., 425, 16-22). 
case. 
opinions case came 
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never bending over to tie the laces on work boots was a exercise" could 
not cause the 12.18.09 disc herniation 
preexisting condition at as found by the Commission (R., Vol. III, p. 425, LI. 16-22). 
The Commission manufactured that medical causation opinion on its own without any 
medical opinion from any medical expert in this case to support that conclusion. 
Dr. Harris opined that the act of Claimant bending over to tie the laces on his work boots 
caused the Claimant's 12.18.09 "acute injury" (CL. 9.28.10 EX. 2, 002003). Dr. Frizzell 
confirmed that bending over at the waist can increase the intradiskal disc pressure and cause a 
lumbar disk to rupture and that he has seen that happen many times throughout his career. Dr. 
Frizzell stated unequivocally that it was the act of bending over to tie his work boot laces that 
caused the Claimant's large L4-5 disk herniation on 12.18.09 (CL. 9.28.10. EX. 3, 003040-
003041; 003042; 003054; 003059; 003062). 
The Court should reverse the Commission's medical causation opinion that the act of 
bending over at the waist was a "trivial exercise" that could not cause the Claimant's L4-5 disc 
herniation "absent Claimant's significant preexisting condition at L4-5" because the 
Commission based that finding on its own medical causation opinion which was clearly 
improper under Mazzone. 
e. Claimant's preexistigg condition_JitL1:-5 clearlv "set the stage" for C_laimant's 12J~~j)9 
accident and in that sense "combined with" Claimant's 12.18.09 accident to cause total 
- ·--~~--·-- - -
426, L. 2). 
s 
not 
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Claimant's 10.22.90 injury. Dr. Frizzell admitted during his 6.4.12 deposition that Claimant's 
10.22.90 disc injury could have prior to his 12.18.09 injury and that it 
would be speculation to assume that his 10.22.90 L4-5 disc protrusion was present prior to 
his 12.18.09 injury (Frizzell, 6.4.12 Dep., p. 34, L. 9 - p. 36, L. 13). Dr. Frizzell established a 
clear causal relationship between the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident and his large L4-5 herniated 
disc (CL. 9.28.10. EX. 3, 003040-003041; 003042; 003054; 003059; 003062). 
The Commission based its entire "combined with" conclusion on medical causation 
opinions that were improperly formulated by the Commission itself and directly contradicted 
by the unrefuted medical causation opinions of the Claimant's attending physicians. Based on 
this Court's holding in Mazzone, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
Commission's conclusion that the Claimant's 10.22.90 impairment "combined with" his 
12.18.09 injury to cause total and permanent disability. 
9. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S 12.5.12 RULING THAT 
QUASI-ESTOPPEL PREVENTS EMPLOYER FROM SHIFTING LIABILITY TO 
THE ISIF 
Employer argues that it was error for the Commission to apply the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel because that legal doctrine is an affirmative defense that had to be affirmatively pled by 
ISIF and listed in the Industrial Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing. The Commission 
rejected Employer's lack of notice arguments because apportionment PPI under 
§72-406 or Idaho §72-332 was a central disputed issue and Claimant 
notice 100% 
to 12.1 
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point of synopsizing the positions of parties is to illustrate that the fight over 
whether the opinion of Dr. Frizzell should prevail over the opinion of Dr. Knoebel is 
a to outcome this matter. One need only 
review the deposition of Dr. Frizzell, or the many letters between Dr. Frizzell and 
counsel for Claimant and Employer to understand that the parties grasp the 
importance of obtaining a favorable opinion on the issue of apportiomnent (R., Vol. 
III, p. 446, L.18-23) (emphasis supplied). 
One of the noticed issues is whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to PPI 
benefits, and it was in connection with his pursuit of PPI benefits that Claimant 
articulated his position that Employer should not be allowed to have it both ways. 
Viewed in the context of Claimant's burden of proof, his reliance on the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel seems to be less an affirmative defense, and more an 
argument made in support of proving his prima facie case (R., Vol. III, p. 448, 
LL 1-9) (emphasis supplied). 
After being placed on notice of quasi-estoppel, Employer chose to completely ignore that 
doctrine in its post-hearing brief: 
"Moreover, although both Claimant and the ISIF argued in their post-hearing briefs 
that Employer should not be allowed to take a different position in this action 
concerning Claimant's preexisting impairment than it did in connection with the 
1990 accident, Employer's post-hearing brief devotes not one sentence to 
treatment of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel or to the ISIF's challenge to 
Employer's inconsistent position. From the Employer's failure to protest, the 
Commission concluded that Employer gave its implied consent to the Commission's 
consideration of these arguments. To the extent necessary, the Commission will treat 
these arguments as though they were raised in the issues noticed for hearing (See 
IRCP l 5(b ); 1Vfurphy v. Browning Freight, 1986 IIC 0664 (1986)) (R., Vol. III, p. 
448, L. 10-18) (emphasis supplied). 
The Commission cited all of the documents that Employer filed with the Industrial 
Commission which supported Commission's that Employer had taken a previous 
position on PPI issue 8 - p. 451, 10) rejected s 
to a "position". 
to 
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7% Claimant's 19% rating 21 years back to his 10.22.90 injury because the 
findings fact were supported substantial and competent evidence the 
unique facts of this case supported application of the quasi-estoppel doctrine as a matter of law. 
10. 
RECOVERING l 00% OF ALL PAST DENIED MEDICAL BENEFITS FROM 
EMPLOYER 
------
This Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 149, 206 P.3d 852, 
855 (2009) placed an obligation on Employer to pay I 00% of the invoiced amount of ALL past 
denied medical benefits incurred by Claimant from date of injury on 12.18.09 to date when the 
Industrial Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5 .17 .11. After the Supreme Court 
dismissed Employer's 2nd interlocutory appeal on 1.30.12, Employer finally complied with Neel 
and paid Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of the medical benefit claims that had been 
adjudicated at the 9.28.l 0 Hearing as Claimant's EX. 7 on or about 2.6.12. 
After making that unconditional payment of Claimant's 9.28.10 EX. 7 medical benefit 
claims, Employer disingenuously raised the doctrine of res judicata to justify its refusal pay 
100% of all past denied medical benefit claims that were not adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing 
as part of CL. 7 (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 17). Employer barely devoted I-page to its resjudicata 
argument in its 8 .15. 12 brief and not even collateral estoppel. 
Commission followed this Court's holding in Wernecke v. Joint School 
Dist. 147 277, 207 1008, 1019 (2009) res 
was to 
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represents a distinct claim for a benefit payable under the workers' compensation 
laws. Every bill that was submitted could have been the subject number of 
defenses to payment raised by Employer/Surety. Employer/Surety could have argued 
that one or more of the bills were incurred outside the chain of referral 
Employer/Surety could have argued that the care was not required by Claimant's 
physician. Employer/Surety could have argued to the Commission that it should have 
found the care represented by a particular bill to be unreasonable. The point is that 
every bill for medical services represents a discrete claim for workers' compensation 
benefits. Accordingly, since it is clear that the bills totaling $24,627.80 are new bills, 
Claimant's entitlement to that which was not adjudicated at the prior hearing, the 
doctrine of res judicata does not bar Claimant's litigation of those bills at this time, 
notwithstanding that most of those bills are for services rendered prior to the date of 
the September 28, 2010 hearing. Aside from the res judicata defense, no other 
defenses to these bills have been raised by Employer/Surety. Accordingly, and per 
Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), Claimant is 
entitled to 100% of the invoiced amount of the bills set forth at Claimant's 
5.17.12Exhibit 14 (R., Vol. III, p. 431, Ll. 3-18). 
Finally, Claimant has claimed entitlement to the sum of $1,684.71, representing 
travel expenses incurred in connection with the medical care, $264.75 representing 
per diem expenses associated with medical care, and $200.01 representing lodging 
expenses incurred in connection with medical treatment. (See C. 5 .17.12 Ex. 16). 
Some of these expenses were incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing, and 
some were incurred subsequent thereto. Claimant contends, and Employer/Surety 
does not dispute, that these expenses are otherwise compensable as medical and 
related expenses under Idaho Code § 72-432. However, Employer/Surety asserts that 
those expenses incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing are barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. As with the claim for additional medical bills, the claims for 
travel, lodging, and per diem expenses were not adjudicated at the time of the initial 
hearing. Therefore, these claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and 
since they are not otherwise contested by Employer/Surety, Claimant is entitled to be 
reimbursed for these expenses as well (R., Vol. III, p. 432, LL 3-15). 
Employer filed a Motion To Reconsider on 10.17.12 and converted its pre-hearing res 
judicata argument into a 2-page collateral estoppel argument at pp. 
reverse 
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the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the 
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided the prior litigation; ( 4) there 
was a final judgment on merits in the prior litigation; and party against 
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 
Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 92, 29 P.3d at 403. This Court finds that collateral estoppel 
does not bar Royal's claim seeking apportionment of liability to ISIF for Stoddard's 
total and permanent disability because the issues are not identical in the two cases. 
Stoddardv. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009). 
The Claimant filed a Motion For Reconsideration on 12.19.12 and asked the Industrial 
Commission to reconsider its decision to apply collateral estoppel to the facts of this case (R., 
Vol. III, pp. 465-494), but the Commission summarily denied that motion on 1.2.13 without 
discussion (R., Vol. III, pp. 504-505). The Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's 
12.10.12 decision to apply collateral estoppel and 1.2.13 denial of Claimant's Motion For 
Reconsideration for the following reasons: 
1. The Commission only listed res judicata and did not list collateral estoppel as a 
disputed issue in its 3.17.12 Notice of Hearing as required by Idaho Code §72-713 
(R., Vol. II, p. 259, LI. 6-11). 
2. The Commission and the parties discussed all of the disputed issues at the 
commencement of the 5.17.12 Hearing and Employer explicitl)' agreed that res 
judicata was the only affirmative defense being raised by Employer. There was no 
mention of collateral estoppel (Tr. 2, p. 4, L. 16-p. 5, L.24). 
3. Based on the Notice of Hearing and agreement of the parties at the Hearing, the 
Claimant only addressed the doctrine of res judicata and did not even mention 
collateral estoppel at pages 25-27 of his 7.27.12 of his post-hearing brief. 
5. 
Claimant/ Respondent's Brief 
res judicata and did not even mention collateral estoppel 
24-25 of its 8.15.12 post-hearing 
47 
p. 429, 
doctrine 
19 p. 432, 15). The Industrial Commission not even mention 
collateral estoppel in its 9.28.12 decision I 12.5.12 amended decision. 
6. Based on that pre-hearing record, the Industrial Commission did not have substantial 
and competent evidence to support its "belief that by raising the doctrine of res 
judicata, Employer raised the issue of collateral estoppel as well" (R., Vol. III, p. 453, 
Ll., 19-22). 
7. The Claimant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate all past denied 
medical benefits at the 9.28.10 Hearing (R., Vol. III, p. 473, L. l -p. 480, L. 23). 
8. The past denied medical benefit matters I issues litigated at the 9.28. l 0 Hearing were 
not identical to the past denied medical benefit matters I issues litigated at the 5 .17.12 
Hearing (R. Vol. III, p. 480, L. 24 - p. 490, L. 7). If the matter I issue was not 
actually adjudicated at the prior hearing, collateral estoppel does not apply. 
Wernecke, supra, 147 Idaho 277, 288, 207 P.3d 1008, 1019 (2009). 
9. This Court ruled in its 7.27.11 Order Dismissing Appeal (R., Vol. I, pp. 74-75) and 
8.15.11 Order Denying Employer's Motion For Clarification (R., Vol. I, p. 76) that 
the Commission's 5.17.11 Order was not a final and appealable Order to which the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel could properly be applied. And, 
10. The Industrial Commission has held that in cases that involve multiple hearings 
between the same parties, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply. 
(Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation, albeit 
including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the same case. Berisha 
v. The Grove Hotel and Insurance Company of the West, 2012 WL 2118142, I.C. 
2002-003038 (Filed: 5.30.12) (See ~13 on p. 13)). 
For all of the foregoing reasons and those set forth in Claimant's 12.19.12 Motion For 
Reconsideration, the Claimant asks this Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's 12.10.12 
erroneous decision to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to allow Employer to avoid this 
Court's holding 
1 . 
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When Employer raised res judicata as a disingenuous device to avoid its obligations under 
Neel, the Claimant filed his 2.13.12 request to include the Idaho Code §72-719 "manifest 
injustice" issue as a disputed issue to be heard and decided at the 5 .17 .12 Hearing and explained 
the manifest injustice that would occur if Employer was allowed escape its obligations under 
Idaho Code §72-432 and Neel by receiving an unearned credit for paying $27,451.27 in past 
denied benefits that Employer never actually paid (R., Vol. II, p. 254-257) (See CL. 5.17.12 EX. 
14, 15 and 16). 
The Commission did not address the LC. §72-719 "manifest injustice" issue in its 12.5.12 
amended decision or its 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration. After receiving the Industrial 
Commission's 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration which applied the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel for the first time, the Claimant filed a Motion For Reconsideration on 12.19.12 and 
again asked the Commission to exercise its authority under LC. §72-719 to prevent the manifest 
injustice that would occur if Employer was given an unearned credit for paying the past denied 
benefits listed in Claimant's 5.17.12 EX. 14, 15 and 16. (R., Vol. III, p. 479 L. 18 - p. 480, 
L.19). 
The Commission could have easily exercised its authority under Idaho Code §72-719 to 
correct manifest injustice by making a simple change to the language of its 5 .17 .11 Order: 
Employer is to pay 100% of the 
benefits incurred by Claimant from the 
date when Commission deemed 
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Page v. Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 306, 179 3d 265, 269 (2008) (Page 
Industrial Commission's refusal to correct a manifest injustice 
Commission based its date of medical stability finding on a medical opinion which lacked a 
proper foundation. basing a stability finding on a medical opinion that lacked proper 
foundation is a proper basis for appellate review to correct manifest injustice, the Court should 
reverse the Commission's refusal to correct the manifest injustice that will occur if Employer is 
rewarded for denying this claim and receives a unearned credit for the payment of all past 
medical benefits listed in CL. 5.17.12 EX. 14, 15 and 16 ($27,451.27) when Employer never 
actually paid those benefits. 
The Commission's ruling not only violates this Court's holding in Neel, it is antithetical to 
the policies of sure and certain relief and the attainment of justice which underlie the Workers' 
Compensation Act: 
"Since the inception of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act, Industrial Commission 
proceedings have been informal and designed for simplicity; the primary purpose of 
these proceedings being the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v. 
Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial 
Commission proceedings should be simple, accommodating to claimants, and above 
all seek justice. Id. "[T]he Commission has historically been imbued with certain 
powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance the likelihood 
of equitable and just results." Id. 
When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting evidence to establish the 
amount of to which he is entitled, and there is no question but 
is entitled to then it is the duty of Board to call attention to 
failure whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is 
Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61 
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12. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION 
IN THIS "CLOSE CASE" TO ONLY A WARD ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON 
EMPLOYER'S UNREASONABLE REFUSAL TO PAY CLAIMANT HIS 
STAGE OF THIS CLAIM 
Employer denied this claim without any reasonable factual or legal reason. When asked 
to explain its denial, Employer refused to offer any facts that would explain why the premises 
presumption did not apply and refused to explain why it would not follow this Court's holding in 
Stevens - lvfcAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008) and resolve all doubts 
over whether the Claimant's injury arose out of employment in the Claimant's favor (CL. 
5.17.12 EX. 9, 009006). 
The Industrial Commission held that this was "a dose case", but refused to award 
Claimant attorney's fees on the following 4 grounds: 
1. Shoe tying is a common occurrence; 
2. Idaho does not have any bright line in the case law regarding when an accident arises out 
of employment; 
3. Idaho does not have any boot lace tying cases; and, 
4. The scope and reach of this Court's holding in Spivey is the subject of legitimate debate 
(R., Vol. I, p. 51, Ll. 21 52, L. 3). 
The 1st ground is a non sequitur. Whether shoe tying is a common occurrence is irrelevant 
to attorney's question. Operation of a motor at is a common occurrence. 
not mean a a motor his 
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that lllJUry not arise out of employment. Commission's logic does not justify a denial 
of Claimant's request for attorney's fees. 
The 2nd ground is based on a misunderstandings of this Court's holdings. Idaho does 
have a bright line of cases which define when an injury "arises out of' employment. If the 
injury happens on the Employer's premises, it is presumed to arise out of employment (See 
Kessler and Foust). If there is any doubt about whether the injury arose out of employment, that 
doubt must be resolved in the Claimant's favor (See Dinius, Spivey, Page I and Stevens-
l'vfcAtee ). Where a causal connection exists between the circumstances under which the work 
must be performed and the injury of which the claimant complains, the injury arose out of 
employment (See Wynn, Gage, Spivey, Page I and Stevens-McAtee). 
The Commission had to overlook the premises presumption, the rule that all doubts about 
whether in injury arose out of employment must be resolved in the Claimant's favor and the 
overwhelming evidence in this case that established a causal connection between the 
requirements of the Claimant's job and the circumstances under which that job had to be 
performed and his low back injury in order to rule against the Claimant on the attorney's fee 
issue. 
The 3rd ground relied on the Commission to deny fees was that Idaho does not have 
any boot tying cases. Idaho Code §72-804 does not require the Claimant 
to prove that Idaho an "arise out case 
exact same a an 
s on 
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nature of the Employer's unreasonable conduct, not on injured worker's mechanism of 
injury which will obviously change case to vicissitudes 
The 4th ground relied on to deny an award of attorney's fees is that this Court's holding in 
Spivey is still the subject of legitimate debate. The Claimant strongly disagrees with this 
statement. Since Spivey was decided in 2002, this Court has cited the Spivey holding with 
approval in at least 8 different cases including, Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 4 77, 
95 P.3d 628 (2004); Page v. AkCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005); Clark v. 
Truss, 142 Idaho 404, 128 P. 3d 941 (2006); Hutton v. Manpower, Inc., 143 Idaho 573, 149 P.3d 
848 (2006); Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008); Fife v. 
Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 260 P .3d 1180 (2011 ); Henry v. Department of Correction, 
Docket No. 39039 (Filed: 1.23.13) and Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 39337 
(Filed: 4.26.13). 
Whether Employer likes it or not, the Spivey Court's rejection of the "greater risk" 
doctrine is the law of this state and Employer and the Industrial Commission have a duty to 
properly apply this Court's holding in Spivey to the facts of each case: 
Reyes invites us to overrule Nelson. We decline to do so. The of stare 
decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly 
wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling 
it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice. Houghland Farms, v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 978, 983 
(1990). Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953 989, (1998) 
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court's holdings in Foust, Kessler, Wynn, Gage, Spivey, Page I, Page and Stevens-McAtee 
properly apply those holdings to facts of this case and accept this claim as 
compensable. 
Just because Employer chose this claim as a test case to convince the Court that it should 
overrule its rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine in Spivey, that does not mean that the holding 
in Spivey is the subject of legitimate debate. When the Industrial Commission accepted 
Employer's invitation to review 80 years of "greater risk" case law and then euphemistically 
labeled Employer's defiance of this Court's holdings as the subject of legitimate debate, the 
Commission's undermined the bedrock principle of stare decisis. Employers should not be 
allowed to willfully defy this Court's holdings and then whitewash their unreasonable conduct 
by calling it the subject of reasonable debate. 
Since the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record proves that Employer's 
denial was not based on reasonable factual or legal grounds, the Court should reverse the 
Commission's 5.17.11 denial and award the Claimant attorney's fees on all benefits awarded in 
its 5.17.11 compensability decision from date of injury on 12.18.09 to date of decision on 
5.17.11 based on the percentages set forth in the Legal Services Contingency Fee Employment 
Agreement between Claimant and Claimant's Counsel dated 1.19.10 (R., Vol. II, pp. 327-330). 
Employer refused to the Commission's 5.17.11 and then 
Commission's authority out Commission 
its own 2-13) 
Brief 54 
briefing which ultimately resulted in the Commission's 12.8.11 Denying Stay. 
should not forced through Employer's unreasonable conduct to re-litigate 
Employer's obligation to pay benefits when Employer's liability for those benefits has already 
been established. 
The 1st ground the Commission gave for denying attorney's fees in its 12.8.11 Order was 
that Employer filed a Notice of Appeal with the Supreme Court (R., Vol. II, p. 212, LL 10-11). 
Employer's decision to file a frivolous interlocutory appeal from the Commission's non-final 
Order which clearly did not resolve all of the disputed issues in the case did not give Employer a 
reasonable basis to refuse to comply with Orders from the Industrial Commission. This Court 
should reverse the Commission's refusal to award the Claimant fees on this ground because the 
Commission's finding did not as a matter of law support its denial of fees under Idaho Code §72-
804. 
The Commission also denied the Claimant's request for fees because after the Supreme 
Court dismissed Employer's 1st interlocutory appeal (which signaled the Court's intent to not 
stay the proceedings before the Commission), the Employer just returned to the Commission and 
asked the Commission to stay the enforcement of its own award (R., Vol. II, p. 212, LL 11-13). 
Employer's decision to go back to the Commission and ask it to stay the enforcement of its own 
Order after 
not engage 
Supreme Court 
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Court had just denied Employer's request a stay by dismissing Employer's appeal. 
Since Commission's finding did not support its denial of attorney's as a matter of law, 
this Court should reverse the Commission's denial of attorney's fees in its 12.8.11 Order. 
In its 12.5.10 Order, the Commission ordered Employer to pay attorney's fees on all 
benefits that it unreasonably refused to pay after this Court dismissed Employer's Motion For 
Permissive Appeal on 1.30.12 including, past denied medical benefits listed in CL.5.17.12 EX. 
14 and 15, past denied mileage, per diem and lodging expenses listed in CL. 5.17.12 EX. 16 and 
the undisputed 12% PPI rating that Dr. Frizzell issued on or about 3.10.11 (R., Vol. II, p. 315, LI. 
20-23) (See Claimant's demand for payment of these benefits in CL. 5.17.12 EX. 17). 
When the Commission entered its 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration, it erroneously 
applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to give Employer an unearned credit for the payment 
of past denied medical benefits that Employer had never actually paid and limited the Claimant's 
award of attorney's fees to Employer's unreasonable refusal to pay the undisputed 12% PPI 
based on the undisputed 12% PPI rating that Dr. Frizzell had issued on 3.10.11 (R., Vol. III, p. 
460, LI. 1-5). 
This Court should reverse the Commission's erroneous misapplication of collateral 
estoppel and Order Employer to pay attorney's fees in accordance with the percentages set forth 
m 
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,.., 
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The undisputed 12% rating that issued on 3.1 11 
The Claimant repeatedly asked Employer to pay all worker's compensation benefits that 
Claimant was entitled to receive in this compensable claim under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. Employer responded to Claimant's multiple requests for the payment of 
benefits and made it clear that Employer had absolutely no intention of making payment of 
any benefits to Claimant until after the Idaho Supreme Court entered its final decision on 
appeal which affirmed the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 compensability decision (CL. 
5.17.12 EX. 17, Bates No. 017010; 017021-017022). The Commission explained by that 
defense was umeasonable in its 12.8.11 decision and its 12.5.12 decision: 
As noted above, the Commission's final order on the issue of compensability brings 
with it an obligation to pay to Claimant those workers' compensation benefits to 
which he would normally be entitled as a result of having suffered a compensable 
accident/injury" (R., Vol. III, p. 435, LL 7-10). 
What Employer/Surety has failed to understand, however, is that the Commission's 
finding that the subject accident is compensable carries with it an obligation on the 
part of Employer/Surety to pay to Claimant those workers' [sic][worker's] 
compensation benefits to which he is entitled as a result of the accident. We find 
nothing in the correspondence going back and forth between Claimant's counsel and 
Defense Counsel which suggests that Employer/Surety at any time disputed the 
claims for additional benefits to which Claimant believed he was entitled. The only 
basis for denial was the aforementioned belief that Employer/Surety had no 
obligation under the May 17, 2011 order to pay anything except those benefits which 
were specifically addressed that 
As explained more 
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particular benefit, Employer/Surety had an obligation to timely pay the same once 
this claim had been found to compensable under workers' compensation laws 
this state. Code§ 72-304) (R., III, p. 8, LL 2-18). 
Since Employer has "neglected or refused within a reasonable time after receipt of a 
written claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee or his dependents the 
compensation provided by law" in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-804, this Court should 
award Claimant attorney's fees at every stage of the litigation from date of injury on 12.18.09 to 
final decision on appeal and on remand to the Commission (See Stevens-,o/lcAtee v. Potlatch 
Cmp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008)). 
CONCLUSION 
---
The Claimant respectfully requests that this Court enter the following Orders on appeal: 
1. An Order affirming the Commission's 5.17.11 "arose out of' employment ruling and 
award of past denied medical benefits and retroactive total temporary disability benefits; 
2. An Order reversing the Commission's 5 .17 .11 decision that Employer came forward with 
sufficient evidence to rebut the premises presumption; 
3. An Order ruling that Claimant was entitled to a favorable ruling on the arose out 
employment issue as a matter of law based on the proper application of the premises 
presumption to the unique facts of this case because Employer only denied this claim on 
the exclusive legal grounds that Claimant's accident and injury did not arise out of 
employment; 
4. An Order reversing the Commission's 5.17.11 decision to not award the Claimant 
attorney's fees; 
5. An Order instructing Employer that it had a duty to comply with the Industrial 
Commission's Orders even if they were not final and appealable Orders and explaining the 
consequences of its failure to so; 
6. An Order Commission's 12.8.11 decision to not award the Claimant 
attorney's fees; 
7. Order 
8. 
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disability; 
11. An Order affirming the Industrial Commission's 12.5.12 decision that quasi-estoppel 
prevents Employer from shifting any liability for Claimant's total and permanent disability 
to the ISIF; 
12. An Order affirming the Industrial Commission's 12.5 .12 decision to award the Claimant 
attorney's fees; 
13. An Order reversing the Industrial Commission's 12.10.12 decision to use collateral 
estoppel to give Employer an unearned credit for the payment of past denied benefits that 
Employer never actually paid; 
14. An Order reversing the Commission's 12.10.12 decision to use collateral estoppel to 
limit its award of attorney's fees to Employer's umeasonable refusal to pay Claimant his 
undisputed 12% PPI award; and 
15. An Order awarding Claimant attorney's fees based on the percentages set forth in his 
Legal Services Contingency Fee Employment Agreement at every stage of this litigation 
from date of injury to date of final decision on appeal and on remand. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of May, 2013. 
Ellsworth, Kallas, & DeFranco, PLLC 
Attorney For Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant 
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